Quantum Key Distribution is a practically implementable information-theoretic secure method for transmitting keys to remote partners performing quantum communication.
ous variable QKD (CV-QKD) and distributed-phase-reference QKD (DPR-QKD). In DV-QKD particle-like (photon) properties of light are exploited whereas in CV-QKD, wave-like properties of light are used. In both cases, a pulse or wavefunction corresponds to a communication bit or symbol whereas in DPR-QKD the latter are encoded with several (e.g. consecutive) pulses. On the reception side, DV-QKD employs photon detectors and counters whereas CV-QKD employs homodyne or heterodyne detection techniques as in traditional telecommunication demodulation. DPR-QKD uses single-photon detectors similarly to DV-QKD, as well as planar lightwave circuit technology interferometers.
It is important to point that several workers such as Zhou et al. 15 found that when communication resources are finite, MDI-QKD secret key rates are typically lower than that of standard decoy-state QKD. Nevertheless, a number of methods exist to circumvent this problem, such as proper basis choice along with intensity selection algorithms 15 in order to achieve longer distances.
In this work several protocols belonging to either DV-QKD or DPR-QKD are optimized and compared on the basis of five distinct sets of experiments 16 run at different locations: BT8, BT13 (British Telecom setups at different operating wavelengths), G13 (Geneva group), KTH15
(Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm) and Japanese Telecom NTT company (Red, Green and Blue sets). The appropriate parameters are given in Table 1 and Table 2 .
General protocol considerations
Alice and Bob use two channels to communicate: one quantum and private to send polarized single photons and another one classical and public (telephone or Internet) to send ordinary messages 17 . As an illustration we consider the BB84 protocol where Alice selects two bases in 2D Hilbert space consisting each of two orthogonal states: basis with (0, π/2) linearly polarized photons, and basis with (π/4, −π/4) linearly polarized photons.
A message transmitted by Alice to Bob over the Quantum channel is a stream of symbols selected randomly among the four above and Alice and Bob choose randomly one of the two bases or to perform photon polarization measurement.
Alice and Bob announce their respective choice of bases over the public channel without revealing any measurement results.
The raw key is obtained by a process called "sifting" consisting of retaining only the results obtained when the bases used for measurement are same.
After key sifting, another process called key distillation 12 must be performed. This process entails three steps 18 : error correction, privacy amplification and authentication in order to counter any information leakage from photon interception, eavesdropping detection (with the no-cloning theorem 12 ) and exploitation of information announced over the public channel.
Error correction is also called Information reconciliation and can be performed with two procedures: one possibility is to correct the errors using parity coding while the other discards errors by locating error-free subsections of the sifted key. Information reconciliation can be further divided into two classes: one uses solely unidirectional information flow from Alice to Bob, while the second uses an interactive protocol with bidirectional information flow.
For instance, the error correction function given by Enzer et al. 19 as: f e (x) = 1.1581 +
57.200x
3 with x the error has been determined experimentally by Brassard et al. 20 and originates from the CASCADE error correction algorithm. CASCADE is highly efficient because it is based on an interactive bidirectional information flow between Alice and Bob. f e (x) value depends on the various error correction algorithms used, and is typically between 1 and about 1.5. When f e (x) = 1, the ideal limiting case is reached where the number of error correction bits is equal to the Shannon limit. In some cases the value of the function is fixed to some convenient value such as 1.33. Other algorithms have been developed by Lutkenhaus 21 and
Zbinden et al. 22 as seen further below.
Privacy amplification is based on randomness extraction allowing to draw from an arbitrary random source consisting of a bit sequence arbitrarily distributed a sub-sequence that has an almost uniform distribution 17 . Mathematically it is described by the notion of Smooth entropy that is a measure for the number of almost uniform random bits.
Quantum communications based on transmitting photons across fiber optics must be able to detect accurately proper signal carrying photons and not "dark photons" originating from noise and intermediate devices during propagation. Thus detector dark counting must be substantially reduced in order to avoid false detection events whereas quantum yield must be increased in order to enhance signal detection quality...
As a consequence, a number of issues should be addressed at the different processing steps such as photon states, bases, encoding of quantum data, determination of mean photon number, transmission handling, error detection and correction algorithms...
The secret key bit rate as a function of distance L accounting for privacy amplification P A(L)
and error correction EC(L) is given asymptotically by:
where Q is the signal gain, e b the bit error, Q µ and E µ total gain and quantum bit error rate for a given mean photon number µ. The first term is due to privacy amplification whereas the second stems from error correction typically based on function f e (x) and h 2 (x) = −x log 2 (x) − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) the binary Shannon entropy.
In the following protocols, we discuss how the previous issues are dealt with.
Simplest protocol
In the simplest protocol case, with no consideration of privacy amplification and accounting for error correction in a rudimentary way, the transmittance versus distance L is given by η t = 10 −αL/10 where α is the wavelength dependent transmission loss along the optic fiber.
The probability of photon detection after traveling a distance L is p signal = µη t η where η is the receiver or detector quantum yield.
µ is optimized versus distance in order to yield the largest secret key rate or may be considered as constant regardless of traveling distance.
The probability of dark photon detection is p dark and the probability of false detection of a photon is p noise = (1 − η t η)p dark . and displayed in fig. 10 . The resulting secret key rate without accounting for pulse frequency is given by:
where Q t is a threshold QBER value. Using the parameters µ = 0.1 and Q t = 0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08 the results are displayed in fig. 10 . In general the QBER depends on several parameters such as channel depolarization (considered as White noise) as well as other types of noise and dark count rate as described next. Error correction algorithms employed to reduce the QBER (see Methods) should be tailored to combat specifically these effects.
QC protocol
This protocol 22 is a slightly more sophisticated version of the previous protocol. Taking account of receiver loss one estimates error correction, privacy amplification effects as a function of QBER 20 and the secret key bitrate is estimated in a simple probabilistic manner, in contrast with the ensuing protocols that we consider in this work. The transmittance versus distance L is given by η t = 10 −(αL+Lc)/10 where L c is receiver loss. After traveling distance L, the probability of photon detection is p signal = µη t η with η the receiver quantum yield. Considering p dark , p noise as respectively the probabilities of dark counting, and false detection of a photon, we deduce the QBER from 22 the ratio of false probability detection to total detection,
where n D is the number of detectors. This is a more elaborate definition than the previous simple
since it accounts for noise and dark counting processes.
In order to evaluate the secret key bitrate, two operations are performed: error correction and privacy amplification that are given approximately 22 by
respectively. Note that the resulting secret key rate
given by:
) and displayed for all experiments in fig. 10 is not of the Shannon asymptotic form (see eq. 1).
BB8protocol
This protocol is based on four states originating from four photon polarizations: |→ , |↑ , |ր , |ց that are used to transmit quantum data with |ր =
A message transmitted by Alice to Bob over the Quantum channel is a stream of symbols selected randomly among the four above and Alice and Bob choose randomly one of the two bases or to perform photon polarization measurement. We consider below two possi-ble sources: the non-entangled Weak Coherent Pulse (WCP) and the entangled Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC) source.
In order to evaluate the effect of the photon pulse nature on BB84 secret key bitrate we start with the WCP case. The latter are photon states with a mean photon number µ that should be low in order to approximate single photon states. The probability that one finds n photons in a coherent state follows Poisson statistics (see Methods section):
with µ the average photon number. The probability to have at least one photon is:
Consequently, the probability to have at least a single count detected by Bob is: The results for the bitrate versus distance for the four telecom company experiments are displayed in fig. 10 .
BBM92 protocol
The BBM92 23 protocol is a two-photon variant of BB84 drawing advantage from BB84 protocol based on a SPDC source providing entanglement as in the previous section. Thus Alice and Bob each share a photon of an entangled photon pair, for which they measure the polarization state in a randomly chosen basis out of two non-orthogonal bases. There is no analog to a photon-number splitting attack in BBM92 and since it is an entanglement-based protocol, expectations indicate it should be more robust than BB84. Moreover it is less vulnerable to errors caused by dark counts, since one dark count alone cannot produce an error in this protocol.
The expressions for the probability of a true coincidence, p true , and the probability of a false coincidence, p f alse , are different for an ideally-entangled photon source and a SPDC-entangled photon source. The secret key bitrate is displayed in fig. 10 for three different sources: Arbitrary, ideal and SPDC. The major parameters 13, 14 are p dark the dark counting probability equal to n D d B where n D is the number of detectors and d B the dark count rate and χ controlling entanglement through SPDC. χ and the mean photon number µ should both be optimized in order to achieve the best secret key bitrate.
DPSK protocol
This is the quantum version of the classical Differential Phase Shift Keying 24 protocol based on coding binary information with phase difference of successive symbols (fixed length bit sequences) instead of coding information with absolute phase of individual symbols (as in PSK modulation). Similarly to BB84, DPSK uses four nonorthogonal states 25 . A photon originating from a single-photon source takes three different paths, the time delays between them being same, using beam splitters or optical switches. Alice randomly modulates by [0, ±π] the phase of the photon retrieved from different routes and sends it to Bob.
Bob measures the phase difference of each consecutive pulse with a 1-bit delay interferometer. Two detectors D1 and D2 are placed at the interferometer output ports. D1 clicks when the phase difference is 0 whereas D2 clicks when the phase difference is ±π. The average photon number per pulse being less than 1, Bob observes clicks occasionally and at random times.
Bob informs Alice of the time instances at which he observes clicks, thus no bit information is leaked to the intruder. Alice is able to identify, from her modulation data, the detector that clicked at Bob location. Transforming D1 and D2 clicks into 0 and 1, Alice and Bob are able to extract an identical bit string.
Eve cannot obtain bit information perfectly from a photon intercepted with beam splitting.
In this type of attack, Eve taps one photon out of multiple photons in a coherent pulse and then obtains bit information by measuring the photon after Alice and Bob exchange supplementary information through a public channel. In conventional BB84, Eve can measure bit information perfectly from a tapped photon. Eve cannot do so in the present scheme, because she cannot measure one of the two phase differences with 100% probability.
For this protocol, we have three sets of results, two for the four European Telecom company experiments BT13, BT8, G13 and KTH15 displayed in fig. 10 and one for the Japanese Telecom company NTT (called Red, Green, Blue) set of experiments displayed in fig. 10 . The experiments differ not only by the parameters as displayed in table 1 and table 2 but also from the algorithms used for evaluating the secret key rate (see Methods section). The parameters are given in table 2.
SARG04 protocol
SARG04 protocol has been developed to combat PNS attacks that are targeted toward intercepting photons present in weak coherent pulses (WCP) that are used for communication. This stems from the fact, it is not possible presently to commercially exploit single photons in a pulse. However, progress in developing large scale methods targeted at using single photons in a pulse is advancing steadily. PNS attacks can be strongly reduced by the decoy method consisting of using states with slightly different intensities than the signal and will be employed in this protocol to further strengthen it. SARG04 being very similar to BB84 12 protocol, the simplest example of secret key sharing among sender and receiver (Alice and Bob), we review first the BB84 case below. Alice prepares many pairs of qubits and sends each one of them to Bob after performing a random rotation over different axes with T l R k where l ∈ {0, 1, 2} and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Upon receiving the qubits, Bob first applies:
• A random reverse multi-axis rotation
• Afterwards, he performs a local filtering operation in order to retrieve one of the maximally entangled EPR Bell 26, 27 states (see Methods section).
• After, Alice and Bob compare their indices k, l and k ′ , l ′ via public communication, and keep the qubit pairs with k = k ′ and l = l ′ when Bob's filtering operation is successful.
• They choose some states randomly as test bits, measure them in the Z basis, and compare their results publicly to estimate the bit error rate and the information acquired by the eavesdropper.
• Finally, they utilize the corresponding Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code 28 to correct bit and phase errors and perform a final measurement in the Z basis on their qubits to obtain the secret key.
The secure key rate with infinite decoy states 29 using one and two photon source contributions, is given by:
where Q n is the gain of the n-photon signal states which can be estimated from the decoy-state method; e pn , e bn are phase and bit error for the n-photon state; Q µ and E µ are total gain and quantum bit error rate for a given mean photon number µ. Bell states, as well as photodiode detectors. This additional step will help discard non perfectly anti-correlated photons and thus reduce transmission error rates. In addition, Alice and Bob not only choose photon polarization randomly, they also use WCP amplitude modulation to generate decoy states in order to confuse the eavesdropper.
The protocol runs as follows:
• Charlie performs Bell measurement on the incoming photon pulses and announces to Alice and Bob over the public channel whether his measurement outcome is successful or not. When the outcome is successful, he announces the successful events as being of Type1 or Type2. Type1 is coincidence detection events of AT and BR or BT and AR.
Type2 is coincidence detection events of AT and AR or BT and BR where AT, BT stand for detecting transmitted (T ) photon events from Alice (A) or Bob (B) linearly polarized at 45
• whereas AR, BR are for detecting reflected (R) photon events at -45
• .
• Alice and Bob broadcast k and k ′ , over the public channel. If the measurement outcome is successful with Type1 and k = k ′ = 0, . . . , 3, they keep their initial bit values, and Alice flips her bit. If the measurement outcome is successful with Type2 and k = k ′ = 0, 2, they keep their initial bit values. In all the other cases, they discard their bit values.
• After repeating the above operations several times, Alice and Bob perform error correction, privacy amplification and authentication as described previously.
In the ideal case (no transmission errors, no eavesdropping) Alice and Bob should discard results pertaining to measurements done in different bases (or when Bob failed to detect any photon). In QKD, Alice and Bob should be able to determine efficiently their shared secret key as a function of distance L separating them. Since, the secure key is determined after sifting and distillation, secure key rate is expressed in bps (bits per signal) given that Alice sends symbols to Bob to sift and distill with the remaining bits making the secret key. For Type i event, we define
as the phase error probability that Alice and Bob emits m and n photons respectively, and
Charlie announces a successful outcome with Q (m,n) i , the joint probability. Consequently the asymptotic key rate for Type i is given as a sum over partial private amplification terms of the 
where the highest index Q is the "Type i" bit error probability and h 2 is the binary Shannon entropy 24 . Moreover, the above asymptotic key rate is obtained in the limit of infinite number of decoy states 33 (see Methods).
We should stress that this method differs from Ma et al. 35 who used a special sifting technique to handle single-photon detector dead-time constraints without considering Type 1 and 2 bit error probabilities depending on photon emission.
Since Charlie is in the middle between Alice and Bob, the channel transmittance to Charlie from Alice is the same as that from Bob. Considering that L is the distance between Alice and Bob, the channel transmittance η T is obtained by replacing L by L/2 resulting in: and Tang et al. 31 parameters with freely varying error correction function f e , α = 0.12 and mean number of photons µ optimized versus distance.
Discussion
Communication distances and secret key bitrates obtained in this work can be improved when we vary the error correction function, DCR and quantum efficiency of the detectors. Our results
show that the most sensitive way to increase communication distance substantially is to decrease the DCR. The least sensitive parameter is the error correction function choice and in spite of exaggerating the values of the quantum efficiency in order to probe the largest possible range of communication distances, the DCR parameter is the most promising, consequently future research efforts ought to be directed towards reducing it considerably. This improvement relies on developing special algorithms that will allow to discriminate between different events occurring around the photodetectors, developing materials with selective specially tailored higher thresholds preventing false "clicks" triggered by "irrelevant" events or using ultralow loss optical fibers that will preserve the signal over longer distances as has been used recently by Yin et al. 36 who managed to attain 404 kms with MDI-QKD.
Methods
Weak Coherent pulse source Coding a sequence of n symbols s 1 , ..., s n entails taking the tensor product resulting in the total wavefunction |Ψ = |ψ(s 1 ) ⊗ ... ⊗ |ψ(s n ) where each individual wavefunction |ψ(s i ) corresponds to a symbol s i .
The quantum state |ψ emitted by a laser is a coherent state depending on a complex value α = √ µe iθ with √ µ the intensity corresponding to an average number of photons µ per pulse and θ the phase. In photon number n space (also called Fock space), the symbol wavefunction is given by:
The probability that n photons are in the coherent state is given by:
recovering the above cited Poissonian result p(n) ≡ P µ (n) = e −µ µ n n! with average photon number n = µ = |α| 2 . Poisson distribution indicates that photons are statistically independent. A single-photon source is aproximated by taking a weak intensity µ such that the probability of emitting a two-photon state is small. In the approximation of two output modes, the state can be written as
where χ is proportional to the second-order dielectric susceptibility χ (2) , pump amplitude and interaction time. |n A , n B denotes the state with n A photons in the mode pertaining to Alice and n B photons in the mode proper to Bob.
Optimization Several protocols require optimization 37 techniques in order to extract the secret key bitrate. Optimization entails varying the mean photon number µ or the entanglement parameter χ until we obtain the largest key bitrate for the longest communication distance. We have used several minimization techniques based on Linear Optimization methods such as the Simplex method in the linear case, whereas a combination of Golden section, Brent or Broyden 38 techniques were used in the non-linear cases 37 .
Rotation operations In the basic four-state SARG04 protocol which is similar to BB84 a num-ber of steps are added to improve it and protect it against PNS attacks. The steps entail introducing random rotation and filtering of the quantum states. Rotation operators 39 use Pauli matrices
is a π/2 rotation operator around the
is a π/2 rotation operator around the (Z − X)
axis.
State encoding In the four-state SARG04 QKD protocol, there are four linearly polarized states to encode quantum data: |→ , |↑ , |ր , |ց with: |ր = (|→ + i |↑ ),
The states are arranged into twelve sets with each set member corresponding respectively to either 0 or 1 binary {|→ , |ց }, {|ց , |↑ }, {|↑ , |ր }, {|ր , |→ }, {|→ , | }, {| , |↑ }, {|↑ , | }, {| , |→ }, {| , |ց }, {|ց , | }, {| , |ր }, {|ր , | }.
Decoy states are described by yields Y n and gains Q n of n-photon states such that:
where total gain Q µ and total quantum error E µ are given by the weighted average of their corresponding n-photon state contributions. For the four-state SARG04 protocol, the Y n and e bn is given by
whereas in the six-state SARG04 protocol, the Y n and e bn is given by
with η n = 1 − (1 − η) n where η = η d 10 −αL/10 and L is the transmission length.
Multiphoton states Working with ν-photon states amounts to prepare pairs of qubits are in the state:
, where A, B denote Alice and Bob and |φ 0 = cos(
Depolarizing quantum channel The QBER or ratio of the number of wrong bits to the total number of bits in the sifted key, is strongly affected by channel depolarization 40 characterized by a single parameter D called "disturbance". D is the probability of receiving a wrong bit after transmission through channel 41 . In the BB84 protocol, a sifted key bit is generated when Filtering A local filtering operation is defined by F = sin(
) |1 x 1 x | where {|0 x , |1 x } are X-eigenstate qubits; they are also eigenvectors of σ X with eigenvalues +1, and -1 respectively. 
(|→→ ± |↑↑ ). They form a complete orthonormal basis in 4D Hilbert space for all polarization states of a two-photon system and the advantage of local filtering is to make Alice and Bob share pairs of a Bell state making the shared bits unconditionally secure 42 .
Asymptotic Entropy In the presence of bit and phase errors, the asymptotic conditional entropy is given by 39 : Lütkenhaus in ref. 16 . µ is optimized with distance. 
